Since the 2015 launch of S&P 500 Annual Dividend Index Futures, there has been a persistent gap between market-implied dividend expectations and actual payouts.  It’s been the same for Russell 2000 and Nasdaq 100 Dividend Index Futures since their launch in 2022. This raises the question: is the tendency to underprice realized dividend growth a harvestable risk premium or a statistical quirk? 

To avoid overemphasizing market pricing on any given day,  we average the pricing for the annual dividend futures over the fourth quarter of each year since their launch and compare the Q4 average expectation to the actual  dividend payouts in subsequent years (as shown in the charts below). The results are striking. In the vast majority of cases, realized dividend payments exceeded implied market expectations from prior years. The only exception was for the S&P 500 during Covid-19 in 2020 when dividend payments temporarily dipped (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Dividend futures tend to underprice realized S&P 500 dividends

Annual Dividend Index Futures for the Russell 2000 of small-cap companies have consistently underpriced realized dividends since their launch in 2022 (Figure 2).  The same is largely true for the Nasdaq 100, although its Annual Dividend Index Futures underestimated 2025 realized payments in late 2024 (Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2: Russell 2000 dividend futures underpriced realized dividends

Figure 3: In 2022/23 Nasdaq 100 dividend futures underpriced realized dividends

This quirk of under-pricing realized dividends is interesting as we look to the future.  Annual dividend index futures on the S&P 500, Russell 2000 and Nasdaq 100 are currently pricing a remarkably pessimistic scenario for equity markets that are trading near record highs in price terms and are at historically high valuation levels, at least in the case of the tech-heavy Nasdaq 100 and S&P 500 (Figure 4). 

Figure 4: High valuation levels for U.S. equities suggest optimism about the future

If trading near record highs and at high levels of valuation suggests financial optimism about the future, it’s not apparent from dividend index futures. In the case of the S&P 500, investors in the dividend futures market are currently pricing only modest nominal growth in dividends and negative real growth when adjusted for inflation by using the break-even spread between standard U.S. Treasuries and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Futures markets price modest growth in dividends and negative real growth

For Nasdaq 100 Annual Dividend Index Futures, the story is bittersweet: there are modest implied expectations for nominal dividend growth, but they are significantly below the recent trend and dividends are flat when adjusted for inflation (Figure 6).  Meanwhile, Russell 2000 Annual Dividend Index Futures imply modest growth for 2026, but outright declines in both nominal and real terms in subsequent years (Figure 7).      In a nutshell, it’s difficult to reconcile the enthusiasm with which investors have rallied equities to record highs of late with their pessimistic pricing of the dividend futures market. Both cannot simultaneously be correct.

Figure 6: The futures curve for Nasdaq 100 dividends is slightly more optimistic but still pricing near-zero real growth

Figure 7: Investors price little in the way of growth for small-cap dividends

Nominal GDP and Dividends

But what about macroeconomics? Is there a macroeconomic argument for slow growth in dividends going forward?  From a macro perspective, dividends should follow this formula: Aggregate Dividends = (Nominal GDP) x (Corporate profits share of GDP) x (The Dividend Payout Ratio).  

When it comes to nominal GDP, there are reasons for both optimism and pessimism.  Nominal GDP growth can be segmented into two parts: real GDP growth and inflation. When it comes to real GDP, it might be difficult for the U.S. to achieve above-trend growth given that unemployment rates remain near historic lows. Unlike the 2010s which began with 10% unemployment and finished with an unemployment rate of 3.5% and simultaneously featured spectacular dividend growth (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Low unemployment makes above-trend real GDP growth a challenge

On the optimistic side, labor productivity has begun to improve and, with the help of generative AI, might achieve growth rates akin to those of 1997 to 2012 when it was growing at nearly 3% per year (Figure 9).  Optimism over Gen AI is one of the major reasons why stock indices are at record highs. It is worth pointing out that S&P 500 dividend growth from 1997 to 2012 wasn’t especially robust as seen in      figure 5. Neither for that matter were the price returns of equities, which changed  little over the period and had two of the deepest bear markets since the Great Depression. In fact, the late 1990s saw sustained economic expansion amid the internet boom that, however, didn’t lead to explosive growth in dividends until the 2010s. 

Figure 9: AI-driven productivity growth could potentially boost real GDP and dividend payments if it leads to greater profits

The same is true for nearly every major economy outside of mainland China, Sweden and Switzerland (Figure 10).  Higher inflation might argue for faster growth in dividend payments, which we will analyse in a future paper.

Figure 10: Core inflation has been above target in most countries outside of China

Corporate profits as a share of GDP and dividend payout ratios

The corporate profit share of GDP has grown significantly over time from 5-6% in the early 1990s to 10-11.5% in recent years. Currently, it is close to a record high of around 11.5% for after-tax corporate profits (Figure 11). This may make it difficult to boost dividends in the future: if corporate profits fall back, dividend payments could stabilize near current levels or even shrink as they did in recession years like 2001, 2008, 2009 and 2020. That said, if investors expect corporate profits to slide over time, why are they pricing stocks at record levels?

Figure 11: The profit share of GDP is near a record high

One possible answer could come in the payout ratio. When companies distribute cash to shareholders, they have a choice: they can either pay dividends, or they can buy back shares. Their preference depends in part on tax treatment. Prior to the U.S. lowering the dividend tax rate in 2003, dividend payouts were in decline. Since then, dividend payout ratios for companies in the S&P 500, S&P 400 Midcap and Russell 2000 as a percentage of total corporate profits have stabilized at around 20%, +/-5% of aggregate U.S. corporate profits (Figure 12). That said, share buybacks have existed for decades and their continued existence should not greatly influence the anticipated growth for dividends barring changes to their relative tax treatment.

Figure 12: Dividend payout ratios are near their average so far this century

In fact, if there was an economic downturn, companies typically slash buybacks and preserve dividends.  

Ultimately, the persistent discount observed in annual dividend index futures may reveal less about the long-term health of the U.S. economy and more about the structural mechanics of the equity derivatives market. While record-high valuations suggest a robust appetite for future growth, the dividend curve remains anchored by the hedging requirements of structured product desks and market makers. This imbalance creates a unique 'dividend risk premium'—a gap where realized payouts consistently outperform market expectations. For the disciplined investor, this disconnect offers a compelling relative-value opportunity: the chance to capture the underlying yield of the S&P 500, Nasdaq 100, or Russell 2000 at a price that seems to ignore the very optimism driving the cash indices to new heights.

Trading dividends

Express a view on the U.S. dividend market with S&P 500 Annual Dividend Index futures.


All examples in this report are hypothetical interpretations of situations and are used for explanation purposes only. The views in this report reflect solely those of the author and not necessarily those of CME Group or its affiliated institutions. This report and the information herein should not be considered investment advice or the results of actual market experience.

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